Impact of Moral Hazard on Credit Risk

L. Shuai, Y. Yang, Z. F. Zhou



Moral Hazard Causes Credit Risk

- Fundamental Reason: Information Asymmetric
 Counterparty with information superiority: opportunism behavior.
- Counterparty with information inferiority: infringe of interest



Assumption (1)

Invest funds x into projects.

Project A brings benefits $x\delta_A$ with probability P_A . Distribution and density function of δ_A is $\emptyset(\cdot)$ and $\varphi(\cdot)$ respectively.

Project *B* brings benefits τ , which is randomly distributed in $[0, x\delta_B]$. Conditional distribution and density function is $F(\tau|x)$ and $f(\tau|x)$.



Assumption (2)

Default occurs when the investment fails.

Probability of default rise with interest rate if the interest rate is sufficiently high (high enough).

Basic Model

- Following the assumptions, the risk of project A is higher than the risk of project B.
- High risk project *B* can not get the loan directly.
- Borrower has motivation to borrow money through low risk project from banks but invest this money into high risk project.



For borrower the moral hazard occurs if and only if the expected return of project A is higher than the expected return of project B.

i.e. $V_{\rm A}(x_{\rm B}) = P_{\rm A}[x_{\rm B}\theta_{\rm A} - x_{\rm B}(1+r)] > \beta - (r+1)x_{\rm B} - \int_{x_{\rm B}(1+r)}^{\beta} F(\tau | x_{\rm B}) d\tau = V_{\rm B}(x_{\rm B}),$

For borrower the moral hazard occurs if and only if the expected return of project *A* is higher than the expected return of project *B*.

i.e. $V_A(x_B) = P_A[x_B\theta_A - x_B(1+r)] > \beta - (r+1)x_B - \int_{x_B(1+r)}^{\beta} F(\tau | x_B) d\tau = V_B(x_B),$ The probability of moral hazard is

 $P_{\rm M}=1-\Phi(H(r)),$

In which

$$\frac{\beta - x_{\rm B}(1+r)(1-P_{\rm A}) - \int_{x_{\rm B}(1+r)}^{\beta} F(\tau \mid x_{\rm B}) \mathrm{d}\tau}{P_{\rm A} x_{\rm B}} = H(r),$$

Proposition 1: The probability of moral hazard is increase on the interest rate.


Impact of moral hazard on credit risk

Relationship between probability of moral hazard and default:

$$P_{\rm D} = P_{\rm M}(1 - P_{\rm A}) + (1 - P_{\rm M})F(x(1 + r)|x),$$

Static analysis

Relationship between probability of default and interest rate






Proposition 2: The relationship between probability of default and probability of moral hazard is nonlinear. There exist two interest rates that can maximize and minimize the probability of default.



Numerical analysis



Thank You